In this paper, we envision a distributed surveillance system where spatially distributed sensors of different modalities can sense collaboratively and continuously large-scale, dynamic, dense and semi-structured environments. The paper discusses surveillance operations in complex and dense environments, such as littoral regions, and describes the key features of distributed surveillance systems. Effective and robust cooperation among the artificial and/or the human agents can synergistically improve the performance of these systems and can endow them with higher-level faculties, such as cooperative target detection and tracking. Different forms of cooperative activities in distributed surveillance systems are mentioned. The paper focuses on intra and inter-platform target cueing and handoff as augmentative forms of cooperation in distributed surveillance.
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Introduction
Modern Armed Forces are increasingly considering the use of the littoral regions, defined as the area between the high water and low water marks, as an operational manoeuvre space from which a sea-borne Task Force can influence situations, decisions and events, as part of a joint/combined mission. Mission objectives may, for instance, be to defend a given strategic area, escort civilian platforms, or provide fire support to friendly forces. All these objectives highlight the necessity and criticality of gaining and maintaining good situation awareness.
Distributed surveillance systems emerge as a key enabler for enhanced situation awareness in complex operations, such as those conducted in littoral areas. These systems encompass spatially distributed static and mobile sensors of different modalities that can sense collaboratively and continuously large-scale, dynamic, dense and semi-structured environments. Distributed surveillance systems aim to help gain and maintain increased awareness, by fusing hard and/or soft data from multiple distributed sources (including sensors and human observers), thus enabling improvements in track accuracy, continuity, and identification over what be achieved by using co-localised sensors. These systems also provide a visualisation-based command and control network facilitating both targeting quality imagery and an integral command and control (Wheatley and McDaniel, 2000) .
Distributed surveillance is a backbone for the popular (among the military) paradigm of network-centric operations (NCO) (Alberts et al., 2000) . NCO is an umbrella term that encompasses the concepts of network centric warfare (USA), network enabled capabilities (UK), network-based defense (Sweden) and network enabled capabilities (NATO) (Hayes, 2004) . This new paradigm tries to achieve agility, rapid response and innovative teamwork. NCO improves information sharing using robust and secure information networks between military platforms. Information sharing and collaboration enhance the shared situational awareness, which dramatically increases mission effectiveness. NCO should shorten the reaction times of the military to act against targets by providing sufficient, accurate and timely data to those that need it in order to make quick decisions. NCO does not merely focus on the network infrastructure necessary to make data available to all. Collecting more information and delivering it faster do not necessarily improve the quality and speed with which decisions are made. NCO is intended to address many aspects: the infrastructure to communicate data, collaborative decision making, rapid re-planning, scheduling and allocations. Distributed surveillance is one of the key enablers of NCO.
In recent years, problems related to distributed surveillance have received an increasing amount of attention from researchers in academia, government laboratories and industry (Liu et al., 2000; Collins et al., 2001; Foresti and Snidaro, 2003; Tseng et al., 2005; Settembre et al., 2008; Miao, 2010; Elmogy, 2010) . This research activity has borne some fruit in tackling some of the challenging problems, which are still open. This paper tackles one of them, cooperation, which is a mechanism by which distributed surveillance units come to work synergistically and harmoniously. The paper highlights the role of distributed surveillance systems in littoral operations focusing on the importance of achieving robust cooperation between distributed surveillance units.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses surveillance operations and describes the key features of distributed surveillance systems. Section 3 highlights the importance of achieving cooperation in distributed surveillance systems, illustrating it by a discussion on two cooperative behaviours in Section 4. A case study of littoral region surveillance is presented in Section 5, and finally, the conclusion and future work are summarised in Section 6.
Distributed surveillance operations
Effective monitoring of persistent and transient objects and events is a key to the effective protection of any Volume Of Interest (VOI). Surveillance is defined as systematic observation of aerospace, surface or subsurface areas, places, persons or things, by visual, aural, electronic, photographic or other means (NATO, 2008) . This systematic observation includes the timely detection, localisation, recognition and identification of objects and events, their relationships, activities and plans, in a given VOI in order to determine whether they are behaving normally or if there is any deviation from their expected behaviour. These operations must be carried out in both civilian and military surveillance systems. Although there are some differences in the operational requirements of civilian and military surveillance systems, as listed in Ince et al. (2000) , in some regions such as littoral regions the boundary between civilian and military surveillance is quite fuzzy. The focus of the discussion in the current paper will be put on military operations.
In littoral regions, a military mission may consist in defending a given strategic area, escort civilian platforms or provide fire support to friendly forces. In all these cases, the adversary (also referred to as the red objects/force) may be sea, land and/or air based. The littoral space increases the exposure of own force, provides the adversary with terrain advantage and imposes severe constraints on own resources operations. As a consequence, human decision-makers are left with a very short reaction time, crucial to the analysis of the situation and the preparation of adequate responses. The following are few factors that further define the complexity of surveillance operations in littoral regions:
• High tempo: The high tempo of operations limits the time available to understand the impact of the events on the mission at hand and to react to them. High tempo imposes the requirements of responsiveness, that is, critical (potential red or harmful) objects must be detected and identified as early as possible so as to provide more reaction time to human decision makers. Responsiveness requirement involves reducing the decision process timeline while maintaining or increasing response quality. Examples of metrics that can be used to quantify the responsiveness in military operations are the time between target detection and delivery of ammunitions on target (also known as the detect-to-engage sequence); time to plan actions; or time necessary to form and equip forces to conduct operations (Alberts et al., 2000) .
• High density: Littoral regions exhibit significant congestion with dense activities (e.g., commercial, educational and recreational traffic) as compared to open, uncrowned environments. In these regions, the adversary may originate from the sea, land or air, or a combination thereof. High density necessitates increased effort on the part of the surveillance system to gain and maintain situation awareness, since the large number of objects/events may distract it from focusing on critical ones.
• Non-Uniformity: In critical applications such as littoral surveillance, high density also imposes a non-uniform environment that cannot be pictured as a confrontation between friendly (also referred to as blue) objects and red (enemy or undesirable) objects. Blue and red, as well as neutral (also referred to as white) objects are interspersed and overlapping, presenting a highly complex challenge with respect to discerning one type of object from another. This situation increases the risk of undesirable effects, e.g., collateral damage.
• Constraints on resources: the nature of the littoral areas (geography, hydrology, proximity of noisy areas, etc.) imposes severe constraints on own resources, particularly the sensors, which significantly affects their performance (e.g., range for radar).
Fully leveraging information superiority and achieving robust cooperation between distributed surveillance units through network-centric capabilities provide a promising solution to overcome, at least partly, these difficulties.
Distributed surveillance systems
The objective of surveillance systems is to provide complete, accurate, and timely information about the presence and activity of all objects or events within a VOI. To build this complete picture of the situation, the system starts by collecting the relevant data in order to identify the different entities and their relationships. Then, the system performs a relational analysis of objects-events followed by intent estimation and consequence prediction. Distributed surveillance systems incorporate self-organised networks of heterogeneous sensing nodes and different processing nodes for picture compilation and exploitation as illustrated in Figure 1 . The sensing (sensors/sources) nodes represent a vast array of spatially distributed static and mobile sensors of different modalities that can sense collaboratively and continuously the VOI. This array can include, but is not limited to, optical imagery systems formed by small but highly capable satellites that provide high resolution imagery to the decision makers, integrated multi-spectral imaging, Electronic Support Measures (ESM), Conventional Scanning Radars (CSR) and/or Electronically Scanned Arrays (ESA) to achieve day and night all-weather performance.
Picture compilation
In distributed surveillance systems, knowledge about complex situations is externalised and distributed among various units. This leads to the need to have a picture where all information spanning the spectrum from the sensor to the shooter is represented in a common model or common work space that allows decision makers to understand the situation at hand. The process of picture compilation (Figure 1 ) aims to generate a representation of the area under surveillance (e.g., an airport or a coastal zone) based on data and information from a variety of sensors/sources. The compiled picture essentially displays information about red objects (adversary, non-cooperative), blue objects (own and friendly), white objects (neutral, usually cooperative) and environmental conditions (Benaskeur et al., 2009b) . This process involves the following sub-processes as represented in Figure 1 :
• Object detection: includes the employment of sensors/sources in order to determine the presence or absence of objects/events or object/event-related data.
• Localisation (or object/event tracking): includes the employment of sensors/sources to determine the positional information and movements of an object/event.
• Object/event recognition: includes the employment of sensors/sources to determine the characteristics of an object/event. Comparing the collected characteristics against reference data (a priori information) can lead to correlation with a level of confidence. In military applications, object identification includes the assignment of one of the six standard identities to a detected contact (hostile, suspect, unknown, neutral, assumed friend, friend), and the class of the object (e.g., aircraft, missile, boat, etc.).
As mentioned earlier, distributed surveillance systems encompass distributed sensing resources that, when properly managed, can provide complete, accurate, and timely information about the presence and activities of all objects or events within a VOI. Sensor management is a very challenging problem in development of distributed surveillance systems. Efficient sensor management can significantly enhance the process of information gathering by automatically allocating, controlling, and coordinating sensing resources in order to collect the most complete and accurate data from a dynamic scene. Sensor management also aids the surveillance process by directing sensing resources as to acquire data that are most relevant to mission objectives (Benaskeur et al., 2009a) . In other words, the role of sensor management in surveillance is twofold, first to direct resources to accomplish particular sensing tasks and second to aid in the refinement of the information gathered by utilising high-level assessments of the data to redirect and optimise the use of sensing resources. Both of these roles are dynamic and must respond to changing conditions in the environment. Potential issues in tactical surveillance for which strategies within sensor management are required are discussed in more details in Benaskeur et al. (2009a) . Moreover, vast and overwhelming amount of data can be generated by the various sensors. To overcome such data overload, selectivity in data gathering and processing becomes an important requirement. This is referred to as selective perception control, in which data is gathered and processed in a manner that harmonises with (and supports) the current needs and/or beliefs. Selective perception control can dramatically shorten the time needed to extract useful knowledge from a given scene, as a selectively controlled surveillance system will focus only on data that are most important for the decision/task at hand and avoid wasting effort to gather and process irrelevant data. Selective perception is a very challenging problem that subsumes the sensor management one, since control and management are applied to both sensing and processing resources in the former and just to the sensing resources in the latter.
Picture exploitation
Examples of pictures exploitation in military applications include: threat evaluation, engageability assessment and combat power management (Figure 1 ). Note that combat power management is not a surveillance operation and is only discussed here for the completeness of the presentation.
• Threat evaluation is defined as the problem of determining the level of threat and the level of priority associated with tracks in a tactical picture. The level of threat indicates how threatening a track is. The level of priority indicates how much attention the operator devotes to a track. To constitute a threat, a track must possess the intent to cause harm as well as the capability and opportunity to achieve intent. The notion of 'causing harm' is understood in a broad sense. Causing harm include causing distraction or negatively interfering the with the blue force mission. From the moment a track has been established to possess one of the three key ingredients (capability, opportunity and intent) but has not been assessed to have them all, we consider it as a potential threat. It becomes a fully edged threat when capability, opportunity and intent components of threat have all been established. We will refer to cues or indicators as the elements of data and information that are used to assess threats. They provide evidence as to the level or priority of threat. They are derived from track characteristics, tactical data, background geopolitical situation, geography, intelligent reports and other data.
• Engageability assessment is defined as the process of assessing the ability of the blue force to apply actions directed at eliminating (or reducing) the level of threat that the red force poses to the blue force. The input is a track (and related information); sensors (and related characteristics); navigation data (including ship postures); mission restraints (including rules of engagement), constraints (objectives) and other related information (e.g., doctrines); ongoing engagements; and planned engagements. The output is a list of feasible actions against a specific red object.
• Combat power management consists in the generation and management of a coordinated plan for the application of combat power in response to the estimate of the current tactical situation.
Key features of distributed surveillance systems
Distributed surveillance systems try to decompose a global task into subcomponents and establish communication channels and coordination mechanisms by which these subcomponents can work together effectively, synergistically and harmoniously. In these systems, computation is parcelled and thus produced information is shared. The capability of the system as a whole is much greater than the sum of those of its subcomponents. The distributed nature of these systems inherently offers the following key features:
• Inherent distribution: In military surveillance, entities such as information sources, surveillance assets and decision makers are naturally distributed over a wide geographic area. Different pieces of information are created and maintained by different nodes. This information could be stored, routed through the network to be fused, analysed and used by other nodes, which may or may not be aware of the existence of the generator node(s).
• Functional separation: Distributed surveillance systems encompass spatially distributed entities that perform different tasks based on their capability and purpose. This function specialisation simplifies the design of the system, as the latter is split into entities, each of which implements part of the global functionality and communicates with the other entities. The main advantage of the distributed system is its ability to allow the sharing of information and resources and its flexibility. Well-coordinated system components can be added, upgraded, moved, or removed without impacting other components. Each component aims to optimise its own performance taking into consideration a well-defined set of system-level performance criteria. This functional separation results in lower processing costs, reduced software complexity and high system flexibility.
• Enhanced real-time response: As mentioned previously, increasing responsiveness is one of the major requirements of military surveillance systems. This can be achieved in distributed surveillance through parallelism and through the placement of sensing and processing nodes close to the theatre of operations. In a network-centric environment, this has the potential to improve the flow of real-time information directly to decision makers providing means of assessing rapidly changing situations and making informed decisions.
• Robustness and resilience: Distributed surveillance systems have a partial-failure property since even if some distributed nodes fail, others can still achieve the mission (at least partly). This failure would only degrade, not disable, the whole system. If the distributed surveillance system has self-organisation capabilities, it can also dynamically reorganise the way in which the individual sensing/processing nodes are deployed. This feature makes the system highly tolerant to the failure of individual nodes. In these systems, control is also decentralised which means that there is no single point of failure.
• Scalability: Systems constantly change, grow and merge introducing variations in scale. There are three different dimensions of distributed system scalability (Neuman, 1994) . The first measure is the size of a system with respect to the number of involved subsystems or nodes. This includes the possibility to easily add nodes to the distributed surveillance system without degrading its performance. Secondly, scalability includes the geographical size, i.e., the distance between individual nodes that affects the communication delay between the nodes. The third measure is related to the manageability of the system as the number of interconnected nodes increase. Distributed surveillance systems usually consist of several interconnected nodes that are controlled by a middleware, which makes these systems able to cope easily and efficiently with increasing number of nodes.
In order to take advantage of the full potential concept of distributed surveillance, distributed surveillance systems must also present the following features, the provision of each of which poses a series of technical challenges.
• Remote connectivity: Provision of remote connectivity between the nodes in distributed surveillance systems is a major technical challenge which cannot be understated. Kopp (2009) listed security of transmission, robustness of transmission, transmission capacity, message and signal routing and signal format and communications protocol compatibility as the main challenges of communication medium in military domain, although most of them apply also to non-military domains. Autonomic networking can provide a promising approach to address these challenges. This concept is used to describe communication networks consisting of self-managing elements capable to support self-configuration, self-healing and self-optimisation (Dressler, 2007) .
• Interoperability: This is the ability of two or more systems or components to exchange information and to use the information that has been exchanged (IEEE, 1990) . Distributed surveillance systems encompass different autonomous, heterogeneous, distributed computational entities that must be able to communicate and cooperate among themselves despite differences in language, context, format or content.
• Accessibility: In distributed surveillance systems, all available resources such as data or computational entities should be easily accessible whenever needed. This includes mechanisms to locate and to access the distributed resources. Quality of service (QoS), such as high success rate to access the resources and/or bounded end-to-end delay needs to be considered as well.
• Security: Distributed surveillance represents a specific domain of interest that highly correlates with information system security. Although the use of multiple distributed sources of information can improve situational awareness, it can make the system more vulnerable to unauthorised access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification or destruction. Data confidentiality, data authentication, data integrity and data freshness represent the main security features required by sensor networks (Perrig et al., 2002 ).
• Self-X capabilities: Distributed surveillance systems rely on using distributed computational nodes that can work autonomously with limited coordination requirements with other nodes and with minimal human intervention. These nodes must have Self-X capability to make decisions about their conditions, processes and course of actions undertaken to achieve their goals. These Self-X capabilities include, but are not limited to, self-synchronisation (Alberts et al., 2000) , self-configuration, self-management, adaptability, self-diagnosis, self-protection, self-healing, self-repair, self-optimisation and self-organisation (Dressler, 2007) .
• World utility function: In distributed systems, large number of artificial and human (rational) agents co-exist and aim each at maximising their respective private utility function. In order to ensure a coherent and synergistic behaviour of the whole system, it is important to define a global (also referred to as world) utility function that drives the behaviour of the entire multi-agent system. Such a world utility function also provides an objective quantification of how well the system is behaving (Tumer and Wolpert, 2003) . Constructing a meaningful and measurable world utility function for complex systems must not to be understated, and different approaches have been proposed in the area of multi-agent systems and collectives. Examples of the proposed world utility function include sum of individual agent utilities, sum of agent utilities and variance and the utility of the worst-off agent (Tumer and Wolpert, 2003) . There are two different perspectives that can be used to approach a distributed surveillance system with well-defined world utility. The first one is called analysis or the forward problem that focuses on how the localised attributes of the system induce global behaviour and thereby determine system performance. The second approach is called design or the inverse problem that tries to induce the behaviour that maximises the world utility through designing private utility functions for each agent (Tumer and Wolpert, 2003) . While the former approach is more suitable for the already existing surveillance systems, the latter is used to design new systems.
Cooperation in distributed surveillance systems
In distributed surveillance systems, cooperation is directed toward improving situation awareness through joint gathering and sharing of information. In these systems, there are a set of cooperative artificial and human agents with know-how-to-cooperate that allows agents to manage interference between their goals, resources, etc., and allows agents to perform their own activities taking into account the activities of the other agents . Each agent relies on its knowledge of other agents and the domain to achieve a high degree of efficiency in reaching both local and global goals. This interaction is characterised by mutual interest and only a partial knowledge of the reasoning steps of the other agents and of the environment (Jones and Jacobs, 2000) . The goals might or might not be known to the agents explicitly, depending on whether or not they are goal-directed. Cooperation in distributed surveillance systems manifests itself in three ways, as described below.
Agent-agent cooperation
A cooperative artificial agent ('agent' henceforth) is a computational entity, which is not limited to react to external stimuli, but is also able to start new communicative and acts autonomously to accomplish a given task. These agents cooperate to more effectively reach the maximal union of their goals. Schmidt lists three forms of cooperation based on the factors that motivate it (Schmidt, 1990 ):
• Augmentative: When agents have a similar know-how, but they must be multiplied to perform a task that is too demanding for only one agent. This task is then shared into similar sub-tasks. Examples of augmentative cooperation in distributed surveillance systems include, but are not limited to, target cueing/handoff and establishing communication through relaying.
• Integrative: Which means that agent have different complementary know-hows and it is necessary to integrate their contribution for achieving a task. Cooperative target detection and tracking using static and mobile sensors is an example of integrative cooperation in distributed surveillance systems.
• Debative: Occurs when agents have a similar know-how and are faced with a unique task, for which they seek the best solution by comparing their results.
These forms of cooperation can occur between artificial and/or human agents. In order to be able to cooperate, these agents should have two types of capabilities, namely, a sufficient know-how for solving problems in an autonomous way and a know-how-to-cooperate (Millot and Lemoine, 1998) , by which agents can share common interests and interact with each other. The know-how is the ability to solve a problem that gives a model of the individual activity of an agent (Pacaux-Lemoine and .
Human-agent cooperation
Surveillance operations often take place under human supervision, which means that information gathering and fusion activities must be coordinated among artificial agents and human agents ('human' henceforth) who try to transform perceptual cues into meaningful information. Generally the human role in his/her interaction with an agent (or a set of cooperating agents) can be described using the concept of control levels (Draper, 1994) . The control level determines the relative importance and frequency of the tasks carried by the human. It refers to the nature of human responsibility for agent functioning and ranges from total control to strategic control. During total control, the human is responsible for all decisions, from strategic planning to trajectory control. At the other end of this continuum, the human is only responsible for relatively long-term plans; at least while the agent is performing the task.
Human-human cooperation
Human-human cooperation is a crucial part of distributed surveillance. In these systems, human operators (co-localised, or geographically distributed) interact dynamically, adaptively and interdependently toward shared objective/goal/mission. The common compiled picture provides an information pool that human operators can share. Thanks to this common workspace, they can take advantage of the results of an activity undertaken by another operator specialist in another area, detect the differences between their understanding of the situation and explain their point of view if they have time to debate (Pacaux- Lemoine and Loiselet, 2002) . In the military context, the importance of collaboration, the ideal form of cooperation, has been underscored by the NCO concept (Alberts et al., 2000; Alberts, 2006) . Collaboration, in this framework, is viewed as the active engagement of participants with different situation models in a sensemaking process. The resulting shared situation model is one that was certainly not in the mind of any of those participants when the collaboration began.
Examples of cooperative activities
Effective and robust cooperation between and among artificial and human agents that form the distributed surveillance systems can synergistically improve the performance of these systems. Examples of cooperative activities, which can endow distributed surveillance systems with increased capability and performance, are given below.
• Dynamic task allocation: Task allocation is a way to divide the labour among available agents. In distributed surveillance systems, dynamic task allocation addresses how to dynamically assign a set of surveillance tasks to a set of agents with similar (or close) know-how to maximise overall expected performance. Each agent usually does not perform all tasks, but rather specialises in a subset of tasks. Generally, dynamic task allocation manifests itself as an augmentative form of cooperation. But, occasionally, it can take a debative form to cope with changes in the situation, such as an agent failure, by dynamically evolving the allocation.
• Communication relay: This consists in establishing communication through relaying in order to dramatically increase radio coverage or expand communications links, primarily over rugged, mountainous or urban terrains. In these cases, a set of agents with similar know-how utilise their range-limited communication capabilities for setting up a communication relay network between a target and a base station. For example, keyhole electronic cameras can provide real-time transmission of images to ground stations via relay satellites or unmanned (aerial/ground/marine) vehicles (UxVs) equipped with wireless transceivers. This cooperation between static and mobile nodes improves communication reliability and capacity. Communication relay is considered as an augmentative form of cooperation.
• Cooperative target detection and tracking: A set of sensors can cooperatively and mutually benefit each other in order to detect and track multiple targets within a certain VOI. Cooperative target detection and tracking combines different forms of cooperation. It starts as integrative cooperation through the dynamic integration of the multi-thread flow of data and information provided by the heterogeneous network of sensors into a picture of the situation. In order to enable continuous intra-and inter-platform tracking of targets using multiple sensors, target cueing and handoff mechanisms are used. Target cueing and handoff can be considered as augmentative forms of cooperation among the distributed sensors. Depending of the application requirements, cooperation in target detection and tracking can also be debative, such as is the 'best track' fusion approach. This is also the case with the track reporting and update approach used by the Link 11 system (Mitchell, 2003) , which can be found in a large variety of modern military platforms. In this form of cooperation, the tracking task is not decomposed into sub-tasks. Rather it is realised by several agents simultaneously to underline the differences and to choose the better result (Pacaux-Lemoine and Loiselet, 2002).
• Common/coherent picture compilation: This process (Figure 1 ) can be seen as an example for integrative cooperation, where there are a set of distributed agents with complementary know-hows and the capacity of each agent is not sufficient to build the tactical picture. In this case, the task must be decomposed into different sub-tasks such as object detection, tracking and recognition allocated to different agents. Note that, by coherent, it is meant a consistent and conflict free picture. Depending on the requirements of the application domain, a coherent picture might not be sufficient, and a common picture is built instead. Building such a common picture is a more challenging problem than building just a coherent one.
• Collaborative picture exploitation: This process (Figure 1 ) starts as integrative cooperation, where contributions from agents in charge, for instance, of assessment of intent, capability and opportunity, respectively. The results from these agents, with complementary know-hows, are integrated to assess the threat level of the target. This form of cooperation can become debative with the involvement of human agents (such as in mixed-initiative approaches).
• Sensemaking: Sensemaking is central to the NCO concept and can be defined as the process of creating a shared awareness and common understanding of the situation of interest, in order to efficiently make decisions. Sensemaking is the process of going from shared awareness to common understanding to collaborative decision making. There is a synergetic dependency between sensemaking and collaboration. Effective NCO depends on creating shared awareness of battlespace at the level of 'actionable knowledge' and generating common/cohesive understanding of the situation through an active process of collaboration between artificial and/or human agents. This collaboration provides a forum for explicit discussion of the quality of information and what it means. It is hypothesised to improve the quality of information both because it makes it possible, for more agents, to have more information and because those agents are expected to represent different points of view and types of expertise or capabilities, thus making it more likely that bad bits of information and analysis, as well as meaningful uncertainties, will be identified (Hayes, 2004) .
• Context-awareness: Context-aware surveillance defines a concept in which the surveillance systems are able to dynamically adapt their functioning as a response to significant changes in the context of operations. Such a capability will create a dynamic collaboration space where relevant information can be adaptively gathered, analysed and shared at the right time with the right nodes. This dynamic reconfiguration can be based on cooperative patterns that co-evolve with the environment's dynamics as a result of exploiting contextual information. The evolution of cooperative patterns can take the form of switching between augmentative, integrative and debative cooperation among the nodes based on contextual information.
Cueing and handoff as augmentative forms of cooperation
In distributed surveillance systems, static and mobile sensors can cooperatively detect and track multiple targets within the VOI. Such target search and tracking operations combine different forms of cooperation. For instance, cooperation can consist in dynamically tasking some sensors to fill the coverage gaps of other sensors, and therefore providing relevant observations in the areas of interest. In order to enable such a continuous spatial/temporal coverage of objects/events using multiple dispersed sensors and platforms, two cooperation mechanisms, namely target cueing and handoff, are often used. Cueing or slaving is the process of using data from sensor S 1 to point sensor S 2 towards the same target or event. S 1 and S 2 may be co-localised on-board the same platform P 1 (we talk about intra-platform cueing), or distributed over two platforms P 1 and P 2 (we talk about inter-platform cueing). The cueing sensor must provide the cued sensor data that contains sufficient information to point to the object/event and identify it as the specific object/event of interest (Bosse and Roy, 1998) . Cueing is done in order to alert, or prepare a sensor for the impending arrival of an object/event of interest and thus improve its response time/performance.
Handoff occurs when sensor S 1 cues sensor S 2 and transfers to it the surveillance responsibility. Here also, S 1 and S 2 may be co-localised on-board the same platform P 1 (we talk about inter-platform handoff), or distributed over two platforms P 1 and P 2 (we talk about inter-platform handoff). Sensor S 2 must then search for the object of interest and verify that it has been acquired. Handoff is often used to ensure a continuity of the tracking process, when a tracked object exits the (spatial/temporal) coverage of one sensor to enter that of another.
Both target cueing and handoff can be considered as augmentative forms of cooperation among set of sensors with similar know-hows. Cueing can also allow for debative cooperation, in situations where the tracking task is accomplished simultaneously by each sensors in order to identify the differences and to choose the sensor with the better performance (Pacaux- Lemoine and Loiselet, 2002) . The debative form of cooperation during cueing is only possible if there is a minimum overlap among the sensing coverage (Figures 2 and 3 ) of the sensors engaged in the cooperative activities. Without such an overlap (Figures 4 and 5 ), only augmentative cooperation is possible. In this case, continuity of tracking is not guaranteed. 
Handling intra-and inter-platform cueing/handoff
The sensor management architecture proposed in Benaskeur et al. (2009a) is used to handle intra-and inter-platform cueing and handoff. For example, at the platform level, each tracking agent, referred to as task holon (TH) in Benaskeur et al. (2009a) , is responsible for maintaining a track of a single object using a variant of the Kalman filter. This TH negotiates with the sensors and platforms, referred to as Resource Holons (RHs), to obtain the service of maintaining the track. Thus track updating responsibilities are not specifically assigned to one RH. Rather, the TH treats the set of RHs as a resource pool, from which it may draw service. This means that as a target passes from one sensor detection coverage to another, the TH manages the inter-sensor cueing and handoff.
When a target passes from the sensing region of one platform to another, it is advantageous to alert the receiving platform, in advance, of the target's impending arrival (see Figures 3 and 5) . This consists in creating a new TH on the receiving platform in order to acquire the tracked object. Cueing and handoff are necessary in order for the group of platforms to maintain 'as continuous as possible' tracks of all the objects within the VOI. At each track update, a new time and location prediction for cueing/handoff events is computed. This prediction is based on the current sensor mode configuration for the platforms/sensors and the current track information. The prediction begins as soon as a platform starts tracking a target. The other platforms that may intercept the target are alerted of the time and location at which the target may enter their sensing coverage.
The original tracking platform updates the others as it gains additional confidence in the target's trajectory. When the target leaves the sensing region of the original tracking platform, the other platforms will have the latest prediction on where the target is going. Each time a TH updates the target track, either by getting an update from a RH or by prediction only, the criticality/importance of the target to other platforms is determined. The target is considered critical/important (e.g., a threat) and a cue is placed on a given platform if the following condition is true:
and
where CP A and T CP A are the closet point of approach (Arumugam and Jermaine, 2006) and the time to CP A, respectively. CP A refers to the positions at which two dynamically moving objects reach their closest possible distance. The constants CP A max and T CP A max are the maximum CP A and maximum T CP A, respectively, at which the object is considered critical. The value of CP A max for a given platform is set according to the maximum sensing range for that platform. For the current implementation, the value of T CP A max is set to a constant, although it could be dependent on the target velocity and sensor properties. The purpose of this condition is to restrict the number of platforms that will be considered for cueing and handoff, and thus reduce the computational complexity of the implementation. Without this restriction, the target being tracked will be cued on all platforms. The original tracking platform assesses whether or not each 'threatened' platform is tracking this 'threatening' object. A new TH is created onboard the platforms that are not tracking the object. This new TH is given a lifetime window that spans the time at which the TH will start to the time at which it will stop trying to acquire the target. For a platform P , it is based on the platform's sensing limits and on the target's velocity according to:
where t T rackStart and t T rackEnd are the starting time and ending time, respectively, of the lifetime window for the TH. t Current denotes the current time, r max (P ) the maximum sensing range of platform P , andṙ(Q) the range rate of the target Q. The parameters are set to trigger the TH when the target is 2.0 kilometres from the sensing range of the platform. More information about threat evaluation based on closet point of approach can be found in Benaskeur et al. (2007) and Appendix C in Benaskeur et al. (2009a) .
Case study: cooperation in littoral region surveillance
This section presents the simulation results for a scenario in which a group of military platforms, located off a coastal area, is tasked with conducting littoral surveillance operations. All detected targets will be tracked. Greater resources will be devoted to the tracking of targets suspected of being critical (smugglers in this scenario). The purpose is to highlight the benefit of implementing the discussed cooperative behaviours (Section 4).
Mission description
The area of interest is limited to the Canadian west coast port of Victoria and surrounding sea approaches (see Figure 6 ). The surveillance region of operation is limited to the triangular section of sea bounded by the coastline and the predefined limits of responsibility as depicted. The area of responsibility will be monitored with a set of platforms and a single ground station located at (0,0). The platforms perform search and provide tracking information to the ground station. In order not to alert the smugglers and cause them to abort their delivery, the ground station will not perform search itself, but rather rely on the referral (cue/handoff) of track information from the platforms. This will reduce the radar signature of the station significantly. One of the main difficulties with this mission is the presence of a large number of spurious targets, i.e., targets that are not likely to be involved in smuggling operations. Targets are constantly entering and leaving the sensing domain of the platforms, and it may become difficult or impossible to track all of them simultaneously while maintaining a search for new targets. The sensor management, as a component of the surveillance system, will aid this process by tailoring the use of the sensing resources based on an assessment of the likelihood of the target being a smuggler. Without this feedback, all targets would be given equal attention by the sensing resources. With the sensor management, those targets that are deemed unimportant to the mission can be tracked less closely providing greater sensing resources for the important ones. This provides significant advantage as the number of targets to be tracked increases. Feedback is particularly important when the sensor capacity is limited, either due to a large number of targets being tracked; or when emission controls are employed. In the presented case, the platforms assess the threat level of all incoming tracks and handoff to the ground station only those tracks that are deemed to be potential smugglers. Thus, the ground station minimises emissions by tracking only the most suspect targets rather than every target in its detection range.
To determine the likelihood of a target being a smuggler, the Closest Point of Approach (CPA) and the Time to the Closest Point of Approach (TCPA) (relatively to the base station) are used as follows:
where k 1 is a scaling constant. This equation will hold for all targets falling outside the (dashed) transport lanes. Those targets falling within the transport lanes are assigned a likelihood L of zero. Targets travelling in established transport lanes and those not headed to the base station, will be considered unlikely smuggler targets, while those travelling outside transport lanes and headed to the base station will be considered likely smuggler targets as illustrated in Figure 6 . With this approach, two targets with the same CPA to Victoria will be given an equal likelihood rating of being smugglers unless one has a smaller TCPA. In this case the track with the smaller TCPA will be rated higher as it is approaching the base faster.
A more realistic approach for assessing smuggler likelihood should involve non-kinematic information such as radar signature and cues such as travel route. For example, a target with a radar signature matching that of a smuggler aircraft, travelling outside (purposely avoiding) the transport lanes should be considered highly likely to be a smuggler, regardless of whether or not the target is headed directly to Victoria. In contrast, transport vehicles may temporarily divert from the commercial transport lanes but this should not necessarily indicate a smuggler. The scenario is simplified by considering that the targets are simulated with straight-line trajectories. Due to this restriction the notion of relating smuggler likelihood to target threat makes sense, as targets will not cross the transport lanes unless their heading directs them away from Victoria (and the base).
Simulation setup
In the scenario, a number of platforms equipped with Electronically Scanned Antenna (ESA) radars as active sensors (Benaskeur et al., 2009a) are arranged in order to detect and track targets within the area of responsibility. Targets are initiated just outside of the platform sensing domains and travel in straight lines across the domains. Incoming and outgoing targets are initially placed at regular intervals along an arc that has a radius [centred at (0,0)] of 1,060 km and 740 km, respectively. Each target is given a heading that sends it directly towards or away from the base station; however, each heading is also subject to a random perturbation of up to plus or minus 10
• . The simulation is run for a time that is sufficient for the targets to pass completely through the platform sensing domains, typically 700 seconds. This simulation provides a rapid increase in tracking load as the targets enter the sensing domains.
In times of high load, tracking an object with more than one platform can be an unnecessary waste of resources. Releasing the platforms from performing redundant track tasks makes these platforms more available for other tasks that may require their attention. This is referred to as load balancing. The load-balancing algorithm employed in this implementation uses the list of platform-level track holons to find objects that are being tracked by more than one platform. If the duplicate tracks are not involved in a cueing or handoff and the objects do not pose a threat to the other platforms, then the duplicate track is removed. To remove the duplicate tasks, the THs are first put into their 'fail' phase of operation and then added to the platforms banned list of objects to consider for tracking. The corresponding tasks will be removed by the platform's Service Interface Command Holon (SICH) in the next time interval (Benaskeur et al., 2009a) . 
Intra-platform target cueing/handoff scenario
This scenario shows the interaction of a single object with a single platform. It illustrates how the platform reacts to an object passing through its sensing area. It demonstrates: a TH utilising two RHs, the detection of an object by a sensor, the tracking of an object with a TH, and the movement of the object as it goes out of the sensing area of the platform. The platform (ship) is placed at (0, 0). In this case, the ship has two sensors with their power and scan rate set to high, which gives them a maximum sensing range of 150 km. The blind sector for the first sensor, S 1 , covers 180
• to 360
• , while the blind sector for the second sensor, S 2 , covers 0
• to 180
• . The sensing regions for both sensors are shown in Figure 7 .
The tracked target is an aircraft with a small radar cross-section travelling at 0.5 km/s. The target is initially placed at (155,50) and travels in the negative X direction into the sensor range of the platform. At the beginning of the scenario, a tracker holon (TH) is created on the platform to scan from 0
• . Since neither sensor can perform this feat separately, but both can together, they alternate scanning both lobes of the circle. In this scenario, S 1 detects and starts reporting on the target to the TH tracker. As the target gets closer to the platform, the tracker becomes more confident in the target's position and so takes measurement readings less often. At 310 seconds, the target passes into the blind sector of S 1 , which is the sensing region for S 2 . At this point, S 2 is used by TH to update the target and S 1 is used only for the ongoing search task. As the target is now moving away from the platform, the tracker confidence in the related positional information decreases (because the sensor error increases with range), so the tracker asks for measurements from S 2 more often to compensate. This continues until about 600 seconds, when the target moves out of the sensing range of the platform. In this case, the tracker can realise that it can no longer track the target, as it is out of range, so it kills itself off. Alternatively, the tracker can ask for positional updates more frequently, as it tries to reestablish the track on the target. With each unsuccessful measurement attempt, the quality of the search deteriorates as the uncertainty of the target's position increases. Once the search quality reaches a minimum allowable value Q min , the tracker is destroyed. In Figure 8 , the blue line indicates track quality Q track , while the red line indicates tracker presence (1.2 means no presence and 1.3 means presence). The track quality Q track is derived directly from the tracking algorithm error covariance matrix (Kalman filter is used as tracking algorithm). This quality of the track can be seen as a world utility function that all sensors try to maximise under constraint of load balancing in order to avoid unnecessary waste of resources. Once the target is acquired, the track quality quickly climbs to Q desired , which, in the presented implementation, is set to unity. As the target approaches the CP A, its criticality increases, which makes the tracker request more updates from the sensor. This will lead to an increase in the track quality Q track . The target reaches the CP A at 310 seconds into the scenario. As the target moves away from the CP A, Q track decreases as a consequence of a decrease in the target criticality. Following the first alternative given in the previous paragraph, when the target goes out of the sensing range of the platform, the TH is promptly destroyed as shown in Figure 8 .
In this scenario, since the platform load depends only on the tracking tasks carried out by a sensor, the load is equal to zero, until a TH is created. When this happens, the platform load increases dramatically as the TH tries to establish Q track = Q desired as shown in Figure 9 . Once this goal has been achieved, and as the object gets closer to the platform, fewer measurements are necessary to maintain the track quality, so the platform load is reduced. At 310 seconds, when the object moves away from the sensing domain of S 1 into the sensing domain of S 2 , the platform load increases as the TH tries to reestablish the track on S 2 . This does not take a long period of time and the platform load quickly settles back to a low amount. At about 600 seconds, the object goes outside the sensing range of the platform. The increasing frequency of measurements increases the platform load as it tries to reestablish the track. Since the track was not reestablished, its quality deteriorated and the corresponding TH is destroyed. The destruction of the TH reduces the platform load to zero.
Inter-platform target cueing scenario
This scenario shows how two platforms coordinate to successfully perform a cueing operation. For the purposes of this validation, two stationary platforms (ships) are modeled. P 1 is positioned at (0; 0), while P 2 is placed at (-350; 0) ( Figure 10 ). Each platform has only one sensor. The sensors have their power and scan rate set to high, which gives them a maximum sensing range of 150 km. Neither sensor has a blind sector. As the tracked target is leaving the sensing range of P 1 , P 2 is cued to expect the target at some point in the future with some degree of uncertainty. This is based on the target's track history on P 1 . When the time arrives for P 2 to expect the target, it begins to scan the area where the target is predicted. Assuming the prediction is correct, P 2 then acquires the target and continues tracking. At the beginning of the scenario, a Search Holon (SH) is created on P 1 to scan from 0
• to 360 • , while no SH is created on P 2 . The target enters the sensing range of P 1 at about 30 seconds. Sensor S 1 detects the target and a Track Holon (TH) is created. At about 600 seconds, the target moves out of the sensing range of P 1 . P 2 has been cued to pick up the target and continue tracking it at around 730 seconds. The target's predicted point of entry on P 2 , is not exact, so the platform begins looking for the object at 700 seconds. The target is not yet in the sensing range of P 2 , so scans are taken continuously until either the target is detected or the time window has been covered. Figure 11 shows the quality of the track Q track . The only difference from the previous scenario is that there are two platforms with non-overlapping sensing regions. The result is that there are two almost identical areas where the target is being tracked. The quality of the track unfolds in the same way for both. The platform loads for both platforms are shown in Figure 12 . The load for P 1 is shown in blue, while the load for P 2 is shown in red. The load on P 1 begins and ends normally, as the object enters and leaves its sensing range. P 2 expects to be able to detect the object at around 730 seconds in the scenario, but this number is not exact, so it starts looking for it at around 700 seconds. At this point, as P 2 begins trying to acquire the object, its load increases. This increased load on P 2 continues until the object is detected and then decreases as the TH becomes confident in the objects position. From that point and onward, the load on P 2 progresses normally. As the object leaves the sensing range of P 2 , an increase in load is shown, reflecting the attempts made to reacquire the object. The same expected behaviour is observed as the object moves beyond the sensing range of P 1 .
Inter-platform target handoff scenario
This scenario shows how two platforms coordinate to successfully perform a handoff operation. As explained previously, handoff is the transfer of the tracking responsibility of a target between platforms. As a target crosses into an area that is covered by both platforms and the T CP A to the original tracking platform is negative (i.e., the target is moving away from this platform), the responsibility of tracking the target is transferred from the original platform to the other.
There are two situations where a handoff of the tracking of a target from one platform to another (P 1 to P 2 ) can occur:
1 Handoff Situation 1 (HS1): a distance greater than the sensing range of P 2 separates P 1 and P 2 , i.e., each platform is not within the sensing region of the other ( Figure 13) 2 Handoff Situation 2 (HS2): the distance between P 1 and P 2 is less than or equal to the sensing range of P 2 , i.e., each platform is within the sensing region of the other (Figure 14 ).
The two situations are distinguished to illustrate the effect of load balancing, as in HS1 a target is deemed critical for one platform, whereas in HS2 it is for both platforms simultaneously. At the beginning of the HS1 validation scenario, a SH is created on P 1 to scan from 0
• to 360 • , while no SH is created on P 2 . The target enters the sensing range of P 1 at about 30 seconds. Sensor S 1 detects it and a TH is created. At about 400 seconds, the target moves into the sensing range of P 2 , which has already been cued to pick it up, and starts trying to acquire it. P 2 starts trying to acquire the target before the predicted time to ensure that it is not missed. Since, the T CP A for P 1 is now negative, its TH is destroyed while P 2 's TH is created. The search is, however, still running on P 1 (as it is still within S 1 's sensing range), which picks up the target and creates a TH in 'verify' mode. It is not until this track reaches 'track' mode that the platform realises that it is the same target that is being tracked by P 2 . The track is then removed. This occurs from 400 seconds to 600 seconds into the scenario. The HS2 scenario operates in much the same way as HS1. Figures 15 and 16 show the track quality for HS1 and HS2, respectively. The track quality behaves as expected for both situations with the exemption of the period around 400.0 seconds in scenario HS1. This is the point where P 1 hands the tracking responsibility off to P 2 . The tracking confidence is higher for P 1 as the target is closer to it. It takes a few seconds for P 2 to build up the track quality in HS1 (see Figure 15) . Whereas, for scenario HS2, the platforms are close together and although the tracking confidence is less for P 2 , it is not enough to make a pronounced difference in track quality. There is, however, a slight change in track quality visible in Figure 16 . The platform loads for HS1 and HS2 are shown in Figures 17 and 18 , respectively. The creation and destruction of the tracking task on P 1 , after P 2 acquires the object and the negative TCPA value of P 2 are reflected in the loads measured on P 1 for both HS1 and HS2. Until the object leaves the sensing range of P 1 , it continues searching the object and creates a TH in 'verify' mode. Sensor readings are taken until this track is promoted to full 'track' mode, at which time the object's identity is verified and the TH is removed for load balancing. This occurs as the object is already being tracked by P 2 and does not pose a threat to P 1 . The platform loads for both platforms are shown in Figure 17 for scenario HS1 and in Figure 18 for scenario HS2. The load for P 1 is shown in blue, while the load for P 2 is shown in red. For scenario HS1, at 400 seconds the load on the first platform increases and decreases as the THs are created and destroyed. This occurs in scenario HS2 at about 310 seconds.
Conclusions
This paper reviewed different challenges of surveillance operations in dense littoral regions. Distributed surveillance systems are discussed as a promising solution that relies on effective cooperation between spatially distributed sensing and processing nodes. Different cooperation patterns in these systems are discussed, with an emphasis on augmentative cooperation. A case study of littoral region surveillance showed the importance of augmentative cooperation among surveillance units to improve response time/performance and to ensure a maximum continuity of tracking of critical targets. An extension of the scenarios is being conducted which increases their complexity following different dimensions: number of targets, target mobility model, moving platforms, and sensor modalities. From the algorithmic perspective, the focus is being put on the threat evaluation concept as a driver for focus of attention. Threat evaluation is being addressed as an aggregation of intent, capability and opportunity assessment for a target of interest. It will provide the high-level information required to make the surveillance system, and the underlying algorithms, adaptive and context-aware. The operational driving requirement for our future research will be the improvement of discrimination power over critical targets and events as an outcome of an adaptive mix of different forms of cooperation.
